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This book is about politics, an activity that has been called a noble profession, a dis-mal science, or a classical art, from different views that are themselves controver-
sial. The study of politics is addressed in this book from two points of departure. First, 
we understand that politics is a fundamental human activity to pursue the common 
interests of the members of a community—that is, in more classic words, the “public 
good.” Second, politics, like any other human activity, can be the subject of systematic 
and reliable knowledge, according to the norms of what is usually called “science.” If 
you are not particularly concerned about these two claims, you can skip the following 
paragraphs and go straight to the fi rst chapter. Otherwise, you may want to spend a 
few minutes reading my arguments for adopting this perspective.
What Is Politics?
When the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle said that “man is a political animal,” 
he did not mean, of course, that to do politics, humans behave like beasts—acting 
only by instinct for fi ght and dominance. Rather, on the contrary, he meant that poli-
tics is one of the essential activities that distinguish humans from other animals 
(together with arts, religion, and science). Only human beings are able to cooperate 
for their common interest and abide by collective rules. Indeed, other animal species 
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do fi ght to distribute resources and can have relationships in which a few individuals 
dominate others. Some people call this politics, although at most it would be in the 
roughest possible sense of the word. More important to understanding the meaning 
and importance of politics is the fact that no animals but humans are able to make 
exchanges to their mutual benefi t, form coalitions and stable organizations, set up 
councils and assemblies, deliberate and vote, make enforceable decisions regarding 
collective affairs, or live in large communities under shared norms.
We should not confound the collective aims of politics with the private motiva-
tions of individuals involved in such an activity. While certain members of interest 
groups, political party activists, and professional politicians holding public offi ces 
may be driven by the ambition of fulfi lling their private desires, including domina-
tion and the enjoyment of power, the collective aim of their activity is the provision 
of public goods. Think a moment about the same problem but regarding another fun-
damental activity of human beings, the arts. While artists can be motivated by the 
search for admiration and applause, the object of artistic activity is not the struggle for 
applause, but, obviously, the production of artwork—whether plays or poems, paint-
ings or buildings, songs or movies—that may be enjoyed by the public. Similarly, the 
object of politics is, regardless of the private motivations of its actors, the provision of 
freedom, security, justice, means of transport, education, health care, clean air, and 
similar goods to the members of the community.
More precisely stated, the stake of politics is the provision of public goods, such 
as those just mentioned, by means of collective action. As we will discuss further in this 
book, public goods are those that cannot be divided into separate pieces or portions to 
be used by different individuals, and thus cannot be provided by solely market or other 
private mechanisms—while cars are private goods because each driver has a car, high-
ways are public goods because all drivers share the same highway. It can be considered 
that the provision of public goods, which requires public institutions, draws a dividing 
line between the domains of public and private activities and defi nes the proper space 
of politics. Some public goods can produce near-universal benefi ts, as may be the case, 
for example, of certain natural resources, the calendar, and the world wide web, which 
may be provided by human cooperation with little institutional structure. But many 
public goods, such as public works, schools, social security, and other services, and the 
taxation policy to fi nance those goods, imply redistribution of resources among differ-
ent members of the community, thus involving confl icts and competition.
All the different subjects presented in this book can be understood from this fun-
damental perspective. In the following pages we will discuss different forms of politi-
cal community and regimes, including dictatorship and democracy, and different 
institutional formulas for democratic regimes, including the relationships between 
parliaments and presidents and diverse political party confi gurations, in turn followed 
by an analysis of different electoral rules and strategies for electoral competition. All 
these institutions, organizations, and behavior can be conceived as mechanisms for 
the choice and provision of public goods.
Why Science?
Politics is not a merely practical activity based on the accumulation of direct experi-
ence. The project of a science or methodical knowledge of politics is as old as politics 
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itself. Many initiators of modern social sciences referred to the model of the sciences 
of nature typically with the aim of constructing some variant of “social physics.” 
Nowadays, almost nobody believes that “natural laws” exist in society. But the out-
comes of human interactions can produce regularities that are amenable to being cap-
tured, as in the other sciences, by stylized models and formulas.
Several disciplines have been taken as references for such an endeavor regarding 
the study of politics. The dominion of law in political studies until the early twentieth 
century promoted collecting data about political regimes and structures from different 
regions and countries of the world, thus providing a remarkable number of observations 
and comparisons. Nevertheless, empirical analyses were frequently mixed with norma-
tive value judgments. In a second period since the mid-twentieth century, political studies 
developed under the drive of empirical, inductive methods imported from sociology and 
psychology. This strongly fostered the adoption of quantitative techniques and statistical 
analyses of people’s social characteristics and political behavior. In more recent decades, 
a new infl uence of economics has produced an outburst of formal models, mathematical 
refi nements, and deductive reasoning in the study of politics. All these contributions are 
somehow cumulative. The scientifi c method indeed requires empirical observations, 
quantitative measurements, and logical models with interesting hypotheses. Both 
inductive and deductive reasoning may be necessary to develop a scientifi c analysis—a 
typical research moves from collecting observations to sketch a hypothesis, from the lat-
ter to amassing a higher number of more precisely identifi ed and relevant observations, 
then to revising or refi ning the initial hypothesis, and so on.
Progress in knowledge of politics and society implies the accumulation of a set of 
propositions about people’s behavior, the consequences of that behavior, and the rela-
tionships between institutions that should have general validity. A scientifi c model 
postulates that a relationship exists among a few clearly defi ned and measurable 
variables, such as, for instance, public goods, organized groups, public expenditure, 
development, dictatorship, democracy, war or peace, regime stability, assembly size, 
electoral rules, legislative performance, cabinet duration, political parties, electoral 
results, and issues on the public agenda. Do not forget that hypotheses must be both 
clearly spelled out, logically consistent, and supported by empirical tests and observa-
tions. Please read Box 0.1, “The Scientifi c Method in Politics,” for further clarifi cations 
of the conditions of validity of scientifi c models and their capacity to predict future 
observations.
Often political scientists are asked to explain the causes of political events and 
to offer their advice for policy making or institutional choice. Although these two 
tasks are strongly related, actually they correspond to two different jobs: political 
scientist and politician. Suppose, for example, that two people make the follow-
ing statements:
GABRIEL: A high number of political parties reduces the degree of political 
polarization.
MELISSA: There should be only two parties in the system to favor stable 
governance.
Note that Gabriel is speaking like a scientist: he is making a claim about how he see 
things. Melissa, in contrast, is speaking like a politician: she is making a claim about 
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how she would like things to be. We should distinguish these two kinds of statements. 
A scientifi c proposition implies an assertion about how things are. A normative 
statement judges how things ought to be.
The difference between the two types of statements is that we can, in principle, 
validate or refute scientifi c propositions by examining evidence. We can collect data 
about the number of political parties in different countries, measure the party systems 
by taking into account the parties” relative size, estimate the policy or ideological 
distance among parties by scrutinizing their legislative and governmental behavior, 
and establish the appropriate relationships between these different sets of data. By 
contrast, a normative statement requires values. Deciding whether having many or 
few parties is good or bad implies a choice in favor of either faithful representation, 
government stability, policy consensus, or favorable opportunities for policy change.
Scientifi c and normative statements should be related, certainly more than igno-
rant and strongly opinionated people tend to suspect. As far as we know how things 
are, we can state our judgment on solid grounds. Gabriel’s claim that a high num-
ber of parties reduces the degree of party distance and polarization (because when 
there are many parties, they tend to be located on relatively “close” positions to one 
another), if true, might lead Melissa to change her advice in favor of having only two 
parties accepted in the system. Yet a normative statement is not based only on sci-
entifi c analysis. Instead, it requires both scientifi c analysis and a choice of values, so 
that even if the two persons agree on how things are, they can still maintain different 
opinions on how they ought to be.
Political scientists, thus, may agree on seeing how things are. Actually, political 
science has made remarkable progress in understating politics throughout the mod-
ern era, as we will see in this book. At the same time, political scientists may differ 
in their advice either because of as-yet-unsolved differences in scientifi c analysis or 
because of diffi cult-to-win arguments regarding values.
Practical politics needs science just as, to continue the analogy, even the prac-
tice of arts needs systematic knowledge. The arts of painting, playing music, or mak-
ing movies are undeniably based in part on innate skills and predisposition, but also 
on training and practice. Artists can indeed benefi t from methodical studies, and 
from the understanding acquired by previous practitioners. As in any other fi eld, arts 
schools are not necessarily successful at producing good artists, but they can be cru-
cial for developing the appropriate human capacities.
Likewise, political science courses, schools and textbooks should provide not only 
knowledge and understanding of political phenomena, but also the best foundations 
for applied exercises. Just as physics is the best foundation for geology and engineer-
ing, and economics has served as solid ground for the expansion of study programs 
in business management, a sound knowledge of political science should be the basis 
for the practice of organization and leadership, electioneering, public policy making, 
public administration, foreign affairs, and other professional activities.
The Book
This book is conceived with the aim of fi lling a persistent gap between developments 
in research and the regular teaching in the discipline. The fi eld of political science 
has made a lot of progress in research and academic publications during the last few 
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decades, but the customary teaching of political science does not match up. As one 
anonymous reviewer of the manuscript of this book wrote, many instructors have to 
“assign a textbook that has very little to do with what they talk about in lectures.”
The materials presented in the following pages are only a selection of the many 
things that we actually know. My choices have been based on the experience accu-
mulated by teaching this kind of course to students with varied backgrounds in three 
different countries on both sides of the Atlantic for more than twenty years. When 
selecting what to include, I tried to apply criteria of simplicity, practicality, and histor-
ical relevance. Some things that are included may need further proofs of their validity, 
but I bet on them because of their relevance and their consistency with other well-
established postulates. Immediately after this introduction you’ll fi nd a set of “Thirty 
Propositions in Political Science,” a summary of fi ndings exposed throughout the rest 
of the book. These propositions are presented in an informal manner, although they 
should become more formal and better proved “theorems” in more advanced studies. 
Certainly much more sound knowledge could and should be taught in other courses 
and textbooks. But my well-grounded impression after writing this book is that, actu-
ally, we know a lot—much more than is usually acknowledged both inside and out-
side the academic discipline of politics.
This book should fi t a regular course of introduction to political science within 
the semester system. It includes four parts with the following titles:
I. Action
II. Polity
III. Election
IV. Government
If the book turns out to be too long for other purposes, it can also be used according to 
the instructor’s needs and criteria. Its partial use can be arranged in different ways:
Parts • I and II can be combined to provide a short introduction to the founda-
tions of politics.
Parts • III and IV, and perhaps chapters from other parts, can form a course cen-
tered on the study of political institutions.
Alternatively, the book can be split as follows:
Parts • I and III can be studied together in a course because they share a “micro” 
approach in which individual decisions explain collective outcomes.
Parts • II and IV, by contrast, share a “macro” approach focusing on structural 
variables, and thus can be studied together.
These different packages may also be suitable for courses in other majors, such as 
political philosophy, constitutional law, political economics, and comparative or area 
studies.
The main body of the book is plain text with a number of boldface terms or 
phrases to be retained in your mind or jotted down in your notes, and only a few sim-
ple formulas. Some extensions are given in separate “boxes,” which may be used at the 
instructor’s discretion depending on the level of the course. There are also a number 
of disparate but intentionally relevant “cases,” or examples from countries and cities 
Colomer_Prelims.indd   xvii 5/21/2010   2:55:24 AM
xvii i
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 20/05/10, NEWGEN
I N T R O D U C T I O N
This is an introductory book without mathematical 
sophistication, but it is inspired by a certain notion 
of what scienti! c knowledge of politics is and should 
be. The basic idea is that the complex and sometimes 
apparently chaotic political reality can be captured by 
stylized models.
Each model postulates that a relationship exists 
among a small number of variables. Let us remark that 
the variables in a model must be well de! ned with 
appropriate concepts—such as public good, inter-
est group, leader, stability, democracy, war, decision 
rule, legislative performance, party, activist, policy 
space, and ideology—which are supplied throughout 
this book. The variables selected should be suscep-
tible of precise observation and, if possible, quanti-
tative measurement. Many political variables can be 
measured—for instance, number of individuals, area, 
number of governments, money, time, votes, seats, 
number of parties, policy “positions,” or ideologi-
cal “distance.” You will ! nd about a dozen indices to 
make quantitative measurements of political variables 
in this book.
A model in politics usually implies some assump-
tions regarding actors’ motives at making decisions, 
that connect the variables just mentioned. Relations 
between variables exist precisely because people make 
decisions. For instance, it is usually postulated that eco-
nomic development favors the stability and duration of 
democracy. But the relation between these two struc-
tural variables—development and  democracy—is deci-
sively mediated by people’s action. A rationale may be 
that under conditions of relatively high average income, 
there is low social polarization, and political actors can 
accept to abide by the rules of the game because los-
ing an election does not imply complete destitution, 
while undertaking a rebellion or coup d’etat would 
be too risky and costly. Choices such as this (to sup-
port democracy) are made under constraints and with 
opportunities supplied by existing structures (in this 
example, favorable economic and social conditions), 
and such choices contribute to stabilizing, changing, 
or creating new structural outcomes (say, a durable 
democratic regime). Observable relationships between 
structural variables can thus be hypothesized, although 
the mechanisms linking those variables should also be 
speci! ed. Strategic interactions can be modeled with 
the help of game theory or related approaches.
For the researcher, the identi! cation of an inter-
esting and relevant problem for study may derive from 
some direct involvement in the issue at hand, a deep 
study of a remarkable case, or a broader research pro-
gram. The formulation of hypotheses regarding the 
relationships among variables and people’s decisions 
usually requires educated intuition or some effort at 
intellectual imagination. The criterion of parsimony 
demands the best possible ratio between the num-
ber of variables considered and the observations to 
be explained. If, for instance, we have a good model 
for explaining the effectiveness of an interest group 
in satisfying its demands as a function of the vari-
able called “group size” (which is clearly measurable), 
and this is congruent with many empirical observa-
tions, it may be “better”—that is, more ef! cient and 
parsimonious—than trying to account for every single 
occurrence by a series of numerous previous events, 
disparate factors, and complex processes, often 
including unlikely episodes.
It is a common warning that models in politics, 
as in other social sciences, are valid only in given cir-
cumstances. But let me argue that many parts of our 
understanding of politics have no less strength or rel-
evance than the accumulated knowledge in other well-
established disciplines. Let us just mention one of the 
simplest and most popular models in economics. Any 
elementary textbook will tell you that in a competi-
tive market for a private good—think, for instance, of 
apples or houses—an equilibrium price exists when the 
quantities demanded and supplied are equal. This is 
mainly derived from the generalized observation that 
people tend to buy less, or at least no more, of a good 
as the price rises, which is called “the law of demand.” 
Possibly you have heard of this. By now, it has become 
common knowledge, although it took several centuries 
of thinking to formulate it with precision and insight. 
Just to mention a completely different ! eld, I am sure 
you can remember a fundamental model in the most 
prized science, physics: “the law of gravity,” which 
explains why bodies tend to fall to the ground.
Models like these form the bases of the modern 
“normal” sciences. But everybody knows that they are 
harsh simpli! cations of reality that can ! t empirical 
observations only under speci! c, very well de! ned, 
but relatively rare circumstances. Equilibrium prices 
do not emerge in daily observations, because certain
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN POLITICSBOX 0 .1
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goods (such as housing, just mentioned, as a particu-
larly strong case) are not as movable or people do not 
have as good information about the market opportu-
nities as is assumed in the model. Likewise, in the case 
of the law of gravity, bodies fall as predicted only in an 
idealized “perfect vacuum,” but to measure and pre-
dict each speci! c episode, the wind, the resistance of 
air, or “friction,” and other conditions have to be esti-
mated. However, individual consumers, families, ! rms, 
traders, and governments would go astray if they did 
not know the basics of price theory, just as engineers, 
bricklayers, plumbers, aircraft pilots, and all of us 
would if we tried to ignore the law of gravity.
As in any other science, models in politics do not 
predict the future in an unconditional sense. They 
merely say that if certain conditions are ful! lled, then 
certain outcomes are likely to be expected. Forecasts 
are always probabilistic. For speci! c predictions, 
the models must be subjected to territorial, tempo-
ral, and other constrains on human behavior. What 
is more, people can change some “variables” on 
purpose. Under the appropriate incentives, actors’ 
decisions on altering political situations may have an 
effect on structural relationships and are, therefore, 
indispensable to accounting for expected collective 
outcomes. Actually, the more knowledgeable a per-
son is in political science, the more he or she may be 
able to manipulate some settings with the intention 
of attaining desirable results. This does not deny, 
however, the scienti! c character of models. Rather, to 
the contrary, well-grounded purposive behavior can 
be the main con! rmation of their validity because it 
implies awareness of their potential implications.
All models should be able to be subjected to 
empirical tests. A model can be either validated or 
invalidated by different ways, most prominently by the 
following procedures, which you may want to study in 
more advanced courses:
• Regression analysis and other statistical techniques 
for large numbers of observations;
• The comparative method for a small number of 
appropriate observations; and
• Laboratory experiments.
Empirical tests can lead to the validation, reformula-
tion, or rejection of hypotheses about relationships 
among variables and people’s decisions. This permits 
cumulative knowledge, which is synonymous of scien-
ti! c progress.
ContinuedBOX 0 .1
all across the world in both remote and current periods. A section on “sources” repro-
duces enlightening fragments of seminal texts from both classic authors and modern 
scholars. Each chapter ends with a “conclusion,” in which the more solid fi ndings are 
recapitulated and the “propositions” mentioned in the main body of the chapter are 
restated. There follows a “summary” and a list of “key concepts” worth studying and 
rereading. A few “questions for review” and “problems and applications” can help the 
course along.
At the end of the book, all the “key concepts” are listed in alphabetical order for 
further consultation. A list of bibliographical references is given for the statements 
presented throughout the chapters, and to entice further reading. Illustrations for part 
openers are by Ambrogio Lorenzetti (c. 1290-1348). Effects of Good Government on the 
Citizenry, 1338-39. Public Palace, Siena, Italy.
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This is an informal collection of propositions and fi ndings exposed throughout this book and specifi cally summarized at the conclusion of each chapter. You may 
want to give it a fi rst reading now in order to realize the scope of our accumulated 
knowledge, although this is only a partial selection of the many things about politics 
we actually know. You should come back to this section after studying this course, as a 
kind of review of substantive things you will have had the occasion to learn.
Action
In this ! rst part of the book, we use the concept of the public good to draw a line between 
the domains of political activity and private concerns. We study the conditions under which 
cooperation among individuals for the common interest of a group or community can 
emerge and hold up. In particular, we address the capacity of leaders to initiate collective 
action and the conditions under which ef! cient leadership can satisfy the public good.
1. PUBLIC GOODS.
In contrast to private goods, public goods are indivisible and cannot be satisfactorily pro-
vided by the market or other private initiatives. The provision of public goods requires 
cooperation or coercion, whether by means of collective action or effective government.
2. GOVERNMENT SIZE.
The demand for public goods and the relative levels of public expenditure by gov-
ernments tend to increase with economic prosperity, institutional stability, and 
democracy.
SOME THINGS WE KNOW
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3. COLLECTIVE ACTION.
Members of small, concentrated, and homogeneous communities or interest groups 
have more incentives to cooperate and participate in collective action than members 
of large, dispersed, and heterogeneous groups. In the public arena, small groups tend 
to have relatively more access to public resources at the expense of large groups.
4. VOICE VERSUS EXIT.
Collective action for the advancement of collective interests, or “voice,” weakens and 
may fail if the rival action of “exit,” in search for an alternative provider, is less costly 
and more likely to give access to public goods.
5. PRISONER’S DILEMMA.
The “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” which is the most famous model in game theory, can 
represent the basic structure of collective action problems for the provision of public 
goods. In this game, each actor has incentives not to cooperate, which may lead to an 
ineffi cient outcome in which all the participants are worse off than if all cooperated.
6. SUSTAINED COOPERATION.
In interactions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma type, sustained cooperation can emerge if 
actors apply the strategy of cooperating and doing unto others as they do do unto 
yourself—also called “Tit for Tat.” Mutual cooperation is more likely the greater the 
uncertainty as to the length of the collective relationship and the higher the number 
of interactions you may be involved in.
7. LEADERSHIP.
Collective action of communities and interest groups can develop thanks to leader-
ship. Leaders distribute the costs of action among group members to provide public 
and private goods, while, in exchange, followers give the leaders votes or support and 
allow them to enjoy the benefi ts of power, fame, income, and a political career.
Polity
In this part, we study the fundamental forms of a political community. In addition to the clas-
sic notions of state-building and nation-building, we discuss how multiple levels of govern-
ment, each with different responsibilities, can be an ef! cient way to provide public goods. 
We analyze the conditions for having a stable democratic government and its consequences 
regarding the provision of public goods, development, and peace.
8. SMALL IS DEMOCRATIC.
Small communities, which tend to be relatively harmonious in economic and ethnic 
terms, are comparatively advantageous for soft, democratic forms of government. In 
recent times, small independent countries and self-governed communities have pro-
liferated, thus making the average country size decrease.
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9. MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE.
Multiple levels of government, including local, state, and global, are necessary for an 
effi cient provision of public goods at diverse territorial scales.
10. FEDERATION NEEDS MANY UNITS.
Local democratic self-government and large-scale provision of public goods can be 
compatible by means of federalism. Many-unit federations, in which no unit is suf-
fi ciently large to dominate, tend to survive and endure. In contrast, two-unit-only 
federations tend to fail, leading to either absorption of the smaller unit by the larger 
one or secession of the small, likely dominated unit.
11. DICTATORSHIPS FAIL AND FALL.
Dictatorships have self-appointed rulers holding on to power by coercive and violent 
means. They can survive on the basis of repression and their “substantive” perfor-
mance, whether economic or other. But they also tend to fall as a consequence of their 
failures, including military defeats, economic crises, or the dictator’s death.
12. DEVELOPMENT FAVORS DEMOCRACY.
Democracy is based on freedom and regular elections of rulers. Economic develop-
ment favors the viability of democratic regimes because it tends to reduce income and 
social polarization and lower the intensity of redistributive confl icts. 
13. DEMOCRACY FAVORS DEVELOPMENT.
Democracy can favor economic development because it is strongly associated with the 
rule of law and is more competent in the provision of public goods.
14. DEMOCRATIC PEACE.
Democratic states are less likely to fi ght one another and engage in wars than 
dictatorships.
Election
In this part, we study how democratic representation can be organized by means of political 
parties and elections. Political parties are organizations that present policy proposals and 
candidates for leadership of! ces. Elections imply competition among candidates on policy 
proposals for different issues, which can be more or less interesting for different groups of 
voters. Electoral results determine the quality and contents of representative government.
15. PARTY OLIGARCHY.
Political parties are organizations that present policy proposals and compete for 
political power. A political organization tends to become an “oligarchy,” that is, it 
tends to be dominated by political leaders or professional politicians seeking votes 
and offi ces.
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16. EXTREME ACTIVISTS.
Voluntary political activists hold more “extreme” policy or ideological positions than 
party voters and even party leadership.
17. MEDIAN VOTER.
In elections in which only two major parties compete, they may have incentives 
to approach each other and converge in their policy positions. Once they converge 
around the median voter’s preference, neither party has electoral incentives to move 
away from the other party.
18. INCUMBENT ADVANTAGE.
Electoral competition is asymmetric between the government and the opposition. 
The incumbent party in government can gain advantage in electoral competition by 
providing or hiding information on its record to obtain credibility.
19. ISSUE OWNERSHIP.
In spite of parties’ convergence in their policy positions on some issues, a party can 
keep advantage and “own” an issue if its past record in government has given it credit 
for policy making on that issue.
20. NON-DEBATE CAMPAIGNS.
In electoral campaigns, rival parties and candidates tend to choose or emphasize dif-
ferent policy issues according to different issue ownership and the parties’ or candi-
dates’ expected relative advantage.
21. POLICY CONSENSUS.
In the long term, broad policy consensus can be accumulated on an increasing num-
ber of issues. But in the short term, mediocre policies and incumbent parties with 
no good performance in government may survive for lack of a suffi ciently popular 
alternative.
22. CONSENSUAL PLURALISM.
There is an inverse correlation between the number of political parties in a system 
and the degree of party polarization in electoral competition. High fragmentation 
of the party system is associated with a high number of issues on the policy agenda, 
which generates low polarization of political competition and more opportunities for 
consensus.
Government
Political institutions are the rules of the game. Typical institutional formulas for governments 
include a one-person of! ce, such as a presidency or prime ministership, and multiple-person 
councils or assemblies. Different political regimes combine different procedures to select 
rulers and different divisions of power and relationships between one-person and multiple-
person institutions, whether of mutual dependency or autonomy.
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23. MAJORITY BIPARTISM.
Presidential and other one-offi ce elections by plurality rule tend to be associated with 
single-party dominance or a balance between two parties.
24. MORE SEATS, MORE PARTIES.
In assembly and parliamentary elections, large size of the assembly and a high num-
ber of seats in each district and proportional representation are associated with a high 
number of political parties.
25. MICRO-MEGA RULE.
When choosing electoral rules, large parties prefer small assemblies and small dis-
tricts by plurality rule, while small parties prefer large assemblies and large districts 
with proportional representation.
26. SMALL ASSEMBLIES, LARGE DISTRICTS
The development of multiple parties favors the adoption of large multi-seat districts 
with proportional representation rules. In the long term, proportional representation 
rules have been increasingly adopted. But in very large countries, a large federal assem-
bly can be elected with different electoral rules, including small single-seat districts.
27. INSTITUTIONAL “DEADLOCK.”
Single-party government promotes a high concentration of power, which may foster 
effectiveness in decision making. In contrast, separate elections for different offi ces 
and divisions of power may produce divided government, “deadlock,” and policy 
stability.
28. MINIMUM COALITIONS.
Political parties in parliament tend to form minimum-size winning coalitions and 
prefer partners located in contiguous policy and ideology positions The distribution 
of cabinet portfolios among coalition parties tends to be proportional to the number 
of seats controlled by each party.
29. CABINET DURATION.
Single-party majority cabinets tend to last longer than multiparty coalition or minor-
ity cabinets.
30. TWO-PARTY STALEMATE.
In a system with division of power between the presidency and the congress, policy 
change is relatively more viable if there are multiple parties or individual members of 
congress ar not strongly tied to party votes. In contrast, a two-party system with strong 
party discipline may prop up confrontation and inter-institutional stalemate.
Colomer_Prelims.indd   xxv 5/21/2010   2:55:25 AM
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 20/05/10, NEWGEN
Colomer_Prelims.indd   xxvi 5/21/2010   2:55:25 AM
